We study the location-inventory model as introduced by Teo et al. (2001) to analyze the impact of consolidation of distribution centers on facility and inventory costs. We associate a cooperative game with each location-inventory situation and prove that when demand processes are i.i.d. this game has a non-empty core. Hence, consolidation does not only lower joint costs (Teo et al., 2001) , but it allows for a stable division of the minimal costs as well.
Background
In the location-inventory problem as defined by Teo et al. (2001) there is a set M = {1, 2, . . . , m} of demand points. The demand for the product at demand point j can be modeled by a continuous stochastic process {d j (t) : t ≥ 0} with mean rate µ j per unit time. In this note we assume that the demand processes are identically and independently distributed (i.i.d.). We assume, without loss of generality, that µ j = 1 for all demand points j ∈ M .
The demands are to be served by n distribution centers (DCs), which are indexed by 1, . . . , n. Let N = {1, . . . , n}. We assume that the demand points (i.e., customers) are indifferent about where their orders are shipped from, and also that the outbound transportation costs do not depend on where the orders are shipped from. We assume that initially each DC i is to serve aggregate demand j∈M x 0 ij d j (t), where the (x 0 ij ) i∈N,j∈M satisfy x 0 ij ∈ {0, 1} (i ∈ N, j ∈ M ) and i∈N x 0 ij = 1 (j ∈ M ). So, the demands at each demand point are exclusively served from a single DC.
A group (coalition) S ⊆ N of distribution centers may decide to cooperate and re-assign the initial demands within the coalition. A demand re-assignment for S is a matrix X S = (x S ij ) i∈S,j∈M that satisfies x S ij ∈ {0, 1} (i ∈ S, j ∈ M ) and i∈S,j∈M x S ij = i∈S,j∈M x 0 ij . Let Π S be the set of demand re-assignments for S. If for a given demand re-assignment X S it holds that X S i := j∈M x S ij > 0, then DC i is set up for which it incurs a fixed setup cost f i . We assume that f i is a per unit time charge, which then also could be treated as and/or include the direct variable costs in running a DC. Let L i be the positive fixed leadtime to supply from the plant to DC i. All stockouts are backordered. The inventory costs at DC i include an ordering cost k i (Q) per order, Q being the ordering size, and proportional inventory holding (penalty) costs accumulating at a constant rate h i (p i ) per unit stock (backorder) per unit time. The ordering cost k i (Q) is modeled as a piece-wise linear concave increasing function of the ordering size Q to account for the economies of scale in purchasing and transportation.
Let S ⊆ N . For i ∈ S define µ S i = j∈M x S ij µ j . If S decides to cooperate, i.e., re-assign the initial demand within S to minimize costs, then the optimal long run average costs for S equal c(S) := min
where χ is the indicator function and C the cost function from the corresponding order quantity/reorder point system, i.e., (Q, r)-system, which we explain next. Given a demand re-assignment X S and under mild conditions on the stochastic demand (see Serfozo and Stidham (1982) and Browne and Zipkin (1991) for detailed discussions) the long run average total costs per unit time for a DC i ∈ S takes the following form:
where G(y) is the rate at which the expected inventory costs accumulate at time t + L when the inventory position at time t equals y ∈ IR, i.e.,
D being the sum of demands that occur during the time interval (t, t + L].
(For x ∈ IR we write
in (2) reflects the average ordering cost. The other term, r+Q r
G(y)dy Q
, reflects the average holding and stockout cost of the system, as the inventory level can be shown to be uniformly distributed between r and r + Q (cf. Zheng, 1992) .
Define r(Q) as the optimal reorder point when the order quantity is fixed at Q, i.e., r(Q) = argmin r r+Q r G(y)dy for all Q > 0. Zheng (1992) showed that
is convex in Q. Hence, using S(0) = 0, we have that
Finally, consider the (Q, r)-system that corresponds to a distribution center that serves a set M ⊆ M of demand points. Since the demand points are i.i.d. we can define G(y, m ) as the associated rate at which the expected inventory costs accumulate at time t + L when the inventory position at time t equals y. The next result is due to Teo et al. (2001) . 
Result
One of the main results in Teo et al. (2001) is that consolidation leads to lower facility investment and inventory costs if the demands are identically and independently distributed. Our result states that these minimal total costs (which correspond to the consolidation into a central DC) can be divided in a stable way among the DC locations. If we reinterpret the set up costs, which are amortized over time, as the costs involved in running a DC, then the existence of a stable cost allocation implies that costs can be divided in such a way that no coalition of DCs can object against the firm centralizing its DCs into one central DC.
To prove our result we show the existence of a core allocation of the cooperative game (N, c) where c is the characteristic function that assigns to every coalition S ⊆ N the optimal long run average costs c(S), as given by (1). The game (N, c) is called the consolidation game associated with the location-inventory situation described in the previous section. A core allocation x = (x i ) i∈N ∈ IR N divides the value c(N ) among the DCs in such a way that no coalition has an incentive to split off, i.e., x(N ) = c(N ) and x(S) ≤ c(S) for all S ⊆ N , where x(S) = i∈S x i for all S ⊆ N . The core Core(N, c) is the set of core allocations. Our result can now be formulated as follows.
Theorem 2.1 Consolidation games have a non-empty core.
Proof. Let (N, c) be a consolidation game. Bondareva (1963) and Shapley (1967) Let S ⊆ N . From Theorem 1 in Teo et al. (2001) we know that an optimal strategy for coalition S is consolidation at some DC in S, say i S .
Let n i := j∈M x 0 ij be the aggregate demand that initially would be served by DC i ∈ N . Define n S := i∈S n i ∈ IN for all S ⊆ N . Note that n N = m.
Consider the strategy for the grand coalition in which with probability λ(S) n S n N (S ⊆ N ) consolidation at i S takes place. Equivalently, a DC i ∈ N is picked with probability
Since this strategy is a weighted average of (pure) consolidation strategies, the associated costs majorize the optimal costs of the grand coalition. Hence,
Inequality (4) follows from Lemma 1.1 with m = n S . Equality (5) follows by substituting z = n S n N y. Equality (6) follows by redefining r (as n S n N r). Inequality (7) follows from (3) with α = n S n N . Equality (8) follows from the optimality for S to consolidate into DC i S . 2
Discussion
In this note we have taken up the analysis of location-inventory models from a game-theoretical point of view. We have shown that instances of the location-inventory model of Teo et al. (2001) with i.d.d. demand processes result in balanced games, i.e., cooperation is not only profitable, but profits can be divided in a stable way as well. This result fits in the recent stream of literature on the interface of inventory control and game theory (see Borm et al. (2001) for a review of operations research games).
The i.i.d. demand assumption in our model is certainly restrictive. However, as also noted by Teo et al. (2001) , if demand processes are for example independent and Poisson with different rates that allow for some common base rate then our result holds as well. An approximation can be used in case there is no common base rate. Further research could focus on general demand distributions. It is well-known, however, that associated optimal inventory cost functions are very complex. Another direction for further research would be the study of more restrictive concepts like concavity to shed more light on the structure of the core.
